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Abstract
In this paper, we present a semantical approach to multi-agent belief revision and belief update. For this,
we introduce relational structures called conditional doxastic models (CDM’s, for short). We show this
setting to be equivalent to an epistemic version of the classical AGM Belief Revision theory. We present
a logic of conditional beliefs that is complete w.r.t. CDM’s. Moving then to belief updates (sometimes
called “dynamic” belief revision) induced by epistemic actions, we consider two particular cases: public
announcements and private announcements to subgroups of agents. We show how the standard semantics
for these types of updates can be appropriately modiﬁed in order to apply it to CDM’s, thus incorporating
belief revision into our notion of update. We provide a complete axiomatization of the corresponding
dynamic doxastic logics. As an application, we solve a “cheating version” of the Muddy Children Puzzle.
Keywords: belief revision, belief update, conditional belief, dynamic epistemic logic, public
announcement, modal logic, multi-agent system
1 Introduction
Once upon a time there were three very wise children, playing in a garden, under
the tall trees. Despite their father’s warning, naughty Adam and Eve got mud on
their foreheads, but obedient Mary stayed clean. Then the father came to them
and said:“Behold, at least one of you is dirty”.
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The story might have easily gone the usual way, with the father repeatedly asking
them if they (knew, or justiﬁably believed, that they) were dirty or not, until the
children had arrived to the correct answer by the sheer power of pure logic. But
... pretty Eve was an impatient girl: before answering any questions, she quickly
took a glance into her pocket-mirror, without anybody even suspecting this. So she
immediately answered “yes, dear father, I know: I’m dirty, and I am sorry”, while
the others could only confess their ignorance. Dirty girl Eve, indeed!
But what would the other two answer if the compassionate father repeated the
Question? Adam’s answer can be correctly predicted using a special case (private
announcements to subgroups) of the logic of epistemic actions, introduced in [5,6,4]
and which we will hereby refer to as “the Rightful Logic”. Indeed, Eve’s peek in
the mirror can be thought of as a fully private announcement (that “Eve is dirty”)
having only herself as the recipient. Using Rightful Logic, one can prove that Adam
will come to the incorrect (but logically justiﬁed) conclusion that he’s clean. This
agrees with our intuitions: not suspecting any cheating, Adam will reason that
Eve could have known she was muddy only if she was in fact the only muddy one.
Moreover, Adam will never be able to retract his wrong answer: Rightful Logic
simply cannot allow him to change his mind. Poor naughty Adam: the dirty boy is
condemned to be forever wrong; but this surely serves him right!?
Sadly, the Rightful Logic predicts an even more unfortunate ending to our story:
after hearing Eve’s answer, innocent Mary will simply go mad! She will simultane-
ously believe that she’s dirty and that she’s clean, so her second answer will only be
an inconsistent mumble. Indeed, according to the Rightful semantics of private and
public announcements, the set of “possible worlds” that she considers as possible
(after Eve’s answer) is empty. Moreover, Mary is condemned to perpetual madness:
no future communication can heal her inconsistencies.
This is in total contrast to our intuitions: a wise Mary should just conclude that
Eve has somehow cheated, obtaining the desired information by some other process
than pure reasoning (e.g. by looking in a mirror or by some other equivalent secret
action). Mary should thus answer “I don’t know” to fathers’ second repetition of the
question, but then in the third round of questioning (after hearing Adam’s wrong
answer), she should ﬁnally say “Now I know, dear father: I’m clean”. Correct
answer, instead of inconsistent mumble: what a happy ending for the immaculate
Mary!
The purpose of this paper is twofold: ﬁrst, to develop a Kripke-model based,
qualitative, multi-agent version of the classical Belief Revision theory, which we call
the logic of conditional 4 beliefs; second, we use this to propose a modiﬁed seman-
tics for private and public announcements, and to axiomatize the corresponding
dynamic doxastic logic, which one may call “the Merciful Logic” (of public/private
announcements). By incorporating the main ideas of classical Belief Revision theory
into our basic semantic structures, the Merciful Logic will save Mary from madness,
will lead her to Truth, and could even give another chance to Adam to redeem
himself, if the father asked the Question once again.
4 or “hypothetical”
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The ﬁrst goal is met by replacing the usual doxastic/epistemic Kripke models
with semantic structures called “conditional doxastic models” (CDM’s). It is im-
portant to note that our approach diﬀers from the recent semantical literature on
the topic of (dynamic or static) belief revision (e.g. [3,10,16,22,23]) in the following
sense. Most Kripke-style models proposed for multi-agent belief revision are based
on speciﬁc mechanisms that rely on quantitative notions, such as “degrees of belief”,
plausibility functions, graded models or probabilistic measures of belief. 5 However,
classical (AGM) belief revision theory is a qualitative theory, based on simple pos-
tulates concerning a basic operation (revision), of great generality and simplicity.
Our approach retains this qualitative ﬂavor of the classical AGM theory.
It is true that we also give a Representation Theorem, showing that any CDM
can be represented as arising from a (multi-agent) epistemic plausibility model
(based on a family of “well-preorderings”). 6 Such models are closer to the ones
encountered in the standard literature on belief revision, being a simple variation
on a theme pursued ﬁrst by Gardenfors (total preorders as plausibility relations)
and later by Spohn [24] (ordinal-valued plausibility functions). However, the corre-
spondence between CDM’s and plausibility models is not one-to-one: the same CDM
corresponds to many diﬀerent plausibility models. This means that, if we take the
conditional doxastic structure as fundamental, we can easily see that all the other
above-mentioned descriptions are somewhat redundant by comparison: they include
irrelevant features, such as speciﬁc ordinal assignments, or plausibility comparisons
between states that are epistemically distinguishable. For this and other reasons 7 ,
we strongly prefer the qualitative description in terms of conditional doxastic maps,
which can be seen as a natural extension of the standard deﬁnition of doxastic
Kripke models, and which gives rise in a natural way to conditional belief operators,
and thus to a conditional doxastic logic CDL. Indeed, the semantic structure of
our CDM’s matches perfectly the structure of our logic CDL, so that a complete
axiomatization can be easily obtained by a simple modal translation of our semantic
clauses.
In this sense, our approach is close to the one in Johan van Benthem’s recent (un-
published) paper [27], of which we became aware only at a late stage of writing this
paper. Though based on (“quantitative”) models involving degrees of plausibility,
the approach in [27] abstracts away from the details of modeling when considering
the associated modal logic, which (is not based on any “graded belief” operator, as
in e.g. [3,10], but) is a simple language of conditional beliefs and update modalities,
virtually identical to ours (for public announcements). As a result, the main “reduc-
tion axiom” in [27], which computes (in the style of the Action-Knowledge Axiom in
[6,5]) the conditional beliefs after a public announcement in terms of initial beliefs,
5 One could argue that the degrees of belief can be given by a plausibility order relation, so by a qualitative,
order-theoretic notion, but in fact the way belief revision or update are deﬁned makes an essential use of
the “arithmetic” of these (ﬁnite or transﬁnite) degrees, e.g. in [24] and [3]; hence, the quantitative ﬂavor.
6 This result can be seen as an analogue in our semantic context of Gardenfors’ representation theorem in
[12], representing the AGM revision operator in terms of the minimal valuations for some total preorder on
valuations.
7 The notion of equivalence between models is sensitive to the choice of deﬁnition. We think that the
“right” such notion for our logic is the natural concept of bisimilarity between CDM’s.
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is identical to our corresponding axiom. In a sense, our approach here is simply
to go one step further, and abstract away (from the speciﬁc details of a particular
quantitative implementation of belief revision operators) on the semantic side as
well. This leads to a perfect match between the syntax (based on conditional be-
liefs) and the semantics (in terms of conditional doxastic models), giving our logic a
broader, more general scope of application and a greater transparency. In its turn,
this greatly facilitates the move to more general contexts: one can easily produce in
this way appropriate analogues of the reduction axioms for private announcements,
and in fact (in unpublished work [8]) we obtain natural generalizations to the case
of arbitrary epistemic/doxastic actions.
Our concepts of conditional belief and of CDM can also be seen in the con-
text of the wide logical-philosophical literature on notions of conditional, see e.g.
[1,25,19,18,9]. One can of course look at our conditional belief operators as non-
classical (and non-monotonic!) implications. Indeed, there have been various at-
tempts and discussions concerning using conditionals to deal with belief revision
(see e.g. [11,15,20]). We will show that our operators avoid the known paradoxes
arising from such mixtures of conditional and belief revision, by failing to satisfy the
so-called Ramsey test (except in absolute, unconditional contexts). Indeed, as ar-
gued in [27], the usual statement of the Ramsey test is based on a confusion between
knowledge of a conditional with premise φ (or rather, between the “static” belief
revision with φ, as captured by our hypothetical beliefs) and the knowledge/belief
held after learning φ (i.e. the “dynamic” belief revision). The approach in [21]
seems also to be closely related to ours: the “models” considered there for belief
revision and belief update are of the same type (except for being single-agent) as
our CDM’s. They consider some natural semantic conditions, in correspondence
with modal axioms, but they do not focus on the same set of postulates as us. 8
The plan of this paper is the following. In the next section we brieﬂy review some
basic notions about knowledge-belief (KB) models and doxastic-epistemic logic. In
section 3, we “revise” the standard (syntactic) AGM revision theory, to make it ap-
plicable to a (multi-agent) epistemic/doxastic language, by considering revision of
beliefs against a knowledge base; this imposes a weakening of the standard “Success”
postulate. Then we convert the (revised) belief revision postulates into semantic
clauses on KB models, obtaining a semantic counterpart of the (revised) AGM the-
ory. In section 4, we deﬁne our central semantic notion, conditional doxastic models
(CDM’s), and we prove this setting to be actually equivalent (modulo the usual KB
conditions) with the above-mentioned “semantic AGM” postulates. We also show
this to be equivalent to a deﬁnition in terms of “well-preordered” plausibility rela-
tions. In section 5, we move to belief updates, by changing the usual semantics of
public announcements to make them act on CDM’s in the natural way, thus allow-
ing beliefs to be “dynamically revised” when learning new information. In section
6, we extend this setting to private announcements to subgroups, we give a com-
plete axiomatization (using “reduction axioms” in the style of [6,5,26,27], and then
8 The notion of update considered in [21] is also completely diﬀerent from our corresponding notion.
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we apply this logic to the task of “saving Mary” from the cheaters, in the above
Muddy-Children-type scenario.
2 Preliminaries: KB-Models and Belief-Knowledge
Logic
A knowledge-belief frame (KB-frame for short, see e.g. [17], pg. 89) is a Kripke
frame of the form (S,→a,∼a)a∈A, with a given set of states S and two binary
relations for each agent; the ﬁrst relation ∼a is meant to capture the knowledge of
agent a, while the second →a captures his beliefs. A KB frame is required to satisfy
the following natural conditions: (1) each ∼a is reﬂexive: s ∼a s; (2) if s ∼a t then
we have: s →a w iﬀ t →a w, and also s ∼a w iﬀ t ∼a w; (3) if s →a t then s ∼a t ;
(4) for every s ∈ S there exists some t ∈ S such that s →a t.
The ﬁrst clause expresses the truthfulness of knowledge, the second expresses full
introspection (an agent knows what he believes/knows and what not), the third says
that agents believe everything they know, and the last (seriality) says that beliefs
are consistent. A knowledge-belief model (KB-model) is a Kripke model having an
underlying KB-frame.
By replacing the accessibility relations with their image-maps 9 , we obtain an
equivalent deﬁnition of a more “coalgebraic” ﬂavor: a KB-frame is a structure
(S, •a, •(a))a∈A, where S is a set of states and •a, •(a) : S → P(S) are maps
satisfying the following conditions:
(1) s ∈ s(a) ; (3) sa ⊆ s(a)
(2) if t ∈ s(a), then sa = ta, s(a) = t(a) ; (4) sa = ∅.
The maps •a and •(a) are called appearance maps: sa is the doxastic appearance
of s to a (or the theory of a about s), and s(a) is the epistemic appearance of s to
a (or the knowledge of a about s). The equivalence between the two deﬁnitions of
knowledge-belief models is easily veriﬁed 10 .
Given a knowledge-belief model S, an S-proposition (or S-theory) is simply any
set P ⊆ S of states in S. This is of course a purely extensional and semantical notion
of proposition/theory, to be distinguished from the syntactical and intensional no-
tions of “sentence” and “theory”. For any S-proposition P and agent a ∈ A, we can
deﬁne as usually the S-propositions BaP (“agent a believes P”) and KaP (“agent
a knows P”) by the standard Kripke deﬁnitions of modalities (for the accessibility
relations →a and ∼a). In terms of appearance maps, these deﬁnitions can be given
in the form of Galois dualities (between appearance and knowledge/belief):
s ∈ BaP iﬀ sa ⊆ P s ∈ KaP iﬀ s(a) ⊆ P
We can deﬁne operations on S-propositions: negation ¬P := S \ P , conjunction
9 The image-map of a relation R ⊆ S × S is the map bR : S → P(S), bR(s) := {t ∈ S : sRt}.
10One way by putting •a =d→a and •(a) = c∼a (where bR is the image-map of R), and the opposite way by
putting: s →a t iﬀ t ∈ sa, and s ∼a t iﬀ t ∈ s(a).
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P ∧ Q := P ∩ Q, general true belief EbP :=
⋂
a∈ABaP (“everybody believes P”)
and general knowledge EkP :=
⋂
a∈AKaP . Finally, we deﬁne common true belief
CbP :=
⋂
n≥0(Eb)
nP = P ∩EbP ∩Eb(EbP ) ∩ · · · and common knowledge CkP :=⋂
n≥0(Ek)
nP = P ∩ EkP ∩ Ek(EkP ) ∩ · · ·.
The Belief-Knowledge Logic (BKL) is a logic whose syntax is given by:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Baϕ | Kaϕ | Cbϕ | Ckϕ
The semantics is given by the obvious compositional clauses: p is given by the
valuation, ‖¬ϕ‖S := ¬‖ϕ‖S etc. As standard, we also use the notation s |=S ϕ for
s ∈ ‖ϕ‖S . Observe that general belief and general knowledge are deﬁnable in BKL
, by putting: Ebϕ :=
∧
a∈ABaϕ, Ekϕ :=
∧
a∈AKaϕ. Under various names, BKL
is a well-known logic and its complete proof system, which we will also denote by
BKL, is given by familiar axioms and rules, see e.g. [17] (pg. 94, where this proof
system is called KL).
3 A semantic, multi-agent, epistemic AGM theory
Classical AGM theory. Classical belief revision takes a syntactic view of the-
ories: we are given a family T of all “theories”, whose members are assumed to
be deductively closed sets of sentences (over some given language). Let ⊥ be the
inconsistent theory (containing all sentences). The expansion T + ϕ of a theory
T ∈ T with a sentence ϕ is deﬁned as T + ϕ := {ψ : T ∪ {ϕ}  ψ}. Now the belief
revision operator ∗ can be introduced by means of the standard AGM postulates:
(*1) T ∗ ϕ is a theory; (*5) T ∗ ϕ = ⊥ iﬀ  ¬ϕ ;
(*2) ϕ ∈ T ∗ ϕ; (*6) if  ϕ ↔ ψ then T ∗ ϕ = T ∗ ψ;
(*3-4) if  ϕ then T ∗ ϕ = T ; (*7-8) if ¬ψ ∈ T ∗ ϕ then
T ∗ (ϕ ∧ ψ) = (T ∗ ϕ) + ψ
Revising the Revision Theory: epistemic AGM. In order to apply belief re-
vision to theories in a doxastic-epistemic language, we need to revise the “Success”
postulate (*5) in an obvious way, since agents’ beliefs about their own beliefs or
knowledge are certain, and thus they should not be revised. More generally, if some-
thing is “known”, than it should not be subject to revision; or, in other words,
any attempt to “revise” with a sentence whose negation is “known” should lead to
a contradiction. This leads us to a “revision of this belief revision postulate”, by
replacing (*5) with its “epistemic version”:
(*5e) T ∗ ϕ = ⊥ iﬀ T  K¬ϕ (i.e. iﬀ (K¬ϕ) ∈ T ).
This revised system, composed of postulates (*1), (*2), (*3-4), (*5e),(*6), (*7-
8), is called epistemic AGM . If, as usually, we assume that knowledge satisﬁes the
Necessitation rule (from  ϕ infer  Kϕ), then from this and (*5e) we obtain as a
consequence the desirable half of (*5): if  ¬ϕ then T ∗ ϕ = ⊥.
Multi-agent AGM. To apply the postulates to theories written in the logic BKL,
we need a multi-agent version of Epistemic AGM. So we need to restate postulate
(*5e) using the labelled operator Ka, for all agents a. But in addition, observe that
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the notion of “theory” and the “revision” operation become relative to agents: a
set of sentences might well be a possible theory for agent a, but not for an agent
b. “Theories” in AGM are supposed to be complete descriptions of (the agent’s)
beliefs about the world. So, for example, a theory that leaves open the question
whether Kbp holds or not (for some given fact p) cannot ever be the (complete) theory
describing agent b’s beliefs (though it can perfectly well describe completely agent
a’s beliefs): due to introspection, b cannot be uncertain about his own knowledge.
So we need to assume as given, for each agent a, a family Ta of “a-theories”. We
assume these to be deductively closed sets of sentences in the logic BKL; as pointed
above, we also need to require a minimal notion of introspectiveness: an a-theory
should settle all the questions concerning a’s beliefs and knowledge. In addition, we
want each revision operator ∗a to act on a-theories, and so to state the postulate
(*5e), we need to require the inconsistent theory to be an a-theory.
So we formulate our revised multi-agent (epistemic) AGM postulates, by giving,
for every agent a ∈ A: a family Ta ⊆ P(BKL) of sets of sentences in the language
BKL, called a-theories, and a belief revision operator ∗a : Ta ×BKL→ Ta, taking
pairs of a-theories and BKL-sentences into new a-theories; and requiring them to
satisfy the following conditions: (T1) ⊥ ∈ Ta (where ⊥ := BKL is the inconsistent
theory, containing all the sentences in BKL); (T2) every T ∈ Ta is deductively
closed, w.r.t. the complete proof system of BKL; (T3) for every ϕ ∈ BKL and
every T ∈ Ta, we have either Kaϕ ∈ T or (¬Kaϕ) ∈ T ; (T4) all the above pos-
tulates of epistemic AGM, in which we label with agent names both the knowledge
Ka and the revision ∗a operators. Observe that it is not necessary to require an
introspective condition corresponding to (T3) for belief, since this follows from the
above conditions, given the axioms of BKL. Indeed, one can easily prove that for
every ϕ ∈ BKL and every T ∈ Ta, we have either Baϕ ∈ T or (¬Baϕ) ∈ T .
Semantic Belief Revision. To develop a semantical counterpart of multi-agent
(epistemic) AGM, we assume as given a KB-model S. We need to replace in the
above postulates the syntactic notion of a “theory” as set of sentences with the
semantic notion of S-theory (i.e. set of states in S); similarly, we replace sentences
by S-propositions (also set of states). Observe that each S-theory T ⊆ S gives
rise to a syntactic theory th(T ) = {φ ∈ BKL : t |=S φ for all t ∈ T}. In addition
to the above postulates, we have to make our belief revision theory consistent with
our theory of beliefs (given by the model S): namely, we have to add a postulate
(T0) requiring that, for each agent a, the agent’s current beliefs form an a-theory.
Finally, we need to replace the operation T + φ and the “deductive closure” of a
theory with their semantic counterparts. To do this, observe ﬁrst that the partial
order on theories is inverted for semantic theories: for S-theories T, T ′ ⊆ S we
have T ⊆ T ′ iﬀ th(T ′) ⊆ th(T ). The inconsistent theory ⊥ is now represented by
the empty set of states ∅ ⊆ S. The deductive closure of the union of two syntactic
theories corresponds to the intersection of the corresponding semantic theories (sets
of states). Hence, expansion T + P of a semantic theory T ⊆ S with a semantic
proposition P ⊆ S is simply given by the intersection T ∩P . As a result, we obtain
the following deﬁnition:
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Semantic Version of Epistemic AGM Postulates. Given a KB-model S, an
AGM belief revision theory for S is deﬁned by giving, for each agent a, a family of S-
theories Ta ⊆ P(S), called a-theories over S, and an operation ∗a : Ta×P(S) → Ta,
such that for all T ∈ Ta, P ⊆ S, we have:
(T0) sa ∈ Ta, for all s ∈ S;
(T1) ∅ ∈ Ta ;
(T2) if T ∈ Ta, then for all s, t ∈ T we have sa = ta and s(a) = t(a).
(*1) T ∗a P ∈ Ta;
(*2) T ∗a P ⊆ P ;
(*3-4) T ∗a S = T ;
(*5e) T ∗a P = ∅ iﬀ T ⊆ Ka¬P (iﬀ T (a) ∩ P = ∅) ;
(*6) if P = Q then T ∗a P = T ∗a Q;
(*7-8) if T ∗a P ∩Q = ∅ then T ∗a (P ∩Q) = T ∗a P ∩Q,
where we used the notation T (a) := {t(a) : t ∈ T}, to indicate the “knowledge of a
in T ”. Observe that, in fact, the above semantic version of the AGM postulate (*6)
is superﬂuous: it is always trivially satisﬁed, due to the extensionality of S-theories.
4 Conditional Doxastic Models
We give now a setting that is equivalent to semantic (multi-agent epistemic) AGM,
though it is much simpler in formulation. Namely, we enrich our knowledge-belief
models to capture a notion of conditional belief. A conditional doxastic frame (CD-
frame, for short) (S, {•Pa }a∈A,P⊆S) consists of a set of states S, together with a
family of conditional (doxastic) appearance maps, one for each agent a and each
possible condition P ⊆ S. These are required to satisfy the following conditions:
(i) if s ∈ P then sPa = ∅; (ii) if P ∩ s
Q
a = ∅ then sPa = ∅;
(iii) if t ∈ sPa then s
Q
a = t
Q
a ; (iv) sPa ⊆ P ;
(v) sP∩Qa = sPa ∩Q, if s
P
a ∩Q = ∅.
A conditional doxastic model (CDM , for short) is a Kripke model whose un-
derlying frame is a CD-frame. The conditional appearance sPa captures the way a
state s appears to an agent a, given some additional (plausible, but not necessarily
truthful) information P . More precisely: whenever s is the current state of the
world, then after receiving new information P , agent a will come to believe that
any of the states s′ ∈ sPa might have been the current state of the world (as it was
before receiving information P ).
Using conditional doxastic appearance, the knowledge s(a) possessed by agent
a about state s (i.e. the epistemic appearance of s) can be deﬁned as the union
of all conditional doxastic appearances. In other words, something is known iﬀ it
is believed in any conditions: s(a) :=
⋃
Q⊆S s
Q
a . Using this, we can see that the
ﬁrst condition above in the deﬁnition of conditional doxastic frames captures the
A. Baltag, S. Smets / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 165 (2006) 5–2112
truthfulness of knowledge. The second condition states the success of belief revision,
when consistent with knowledge: if something is not known to be false, then it
can be consistently entertained as a hypothesis. The third condition expresses full
introspection of (conditional) beliefs: agents know their own conditional beliefs, so
they cannot revise their beliefs about them. The fourth condition says hypotheses
are hypothetically believed: when making a hypothesis, that hypothesis is taken to
be true. The last condition describes minimality of revision: when faced with new
information Q, agents keep as much as possible of their previous (conditional) beliefs
sPa .
These requirements can be seen as strengthenings of the clauses deﬁning a KB-
frame: indeed, every CD-frame is a KB-frame. To see this, it is enough to deﬁne
sa := s
S
a , and check this satisﬁes all the KB assumptions. In other words: we
can recover the unconditional (“default”) beliefs as conditional beliefs with respect
to some trivially true condition.
Alternatively, we can deﬁne a conditional doxastic frame relationally as a tuple
(S, {
P
→a}a∈A,P⊆S), where
P
→a are binary relations, satisfying the clauses: (1.) if
s ∈ P then there exists some state t such that s
P
→a t; (2.) if s
Q
→a t ∈ P , then there
exists a state w ∈ S such that s
P
→a w; (3.) if s
P
→a t then for every state w ∈ S we
have: s
Q
→a w iﬀ t
Q
→a w; (4.) if s
P
→a t then t ∈ P ; (5.) if there exists s
P
→a t ∈ Q
then, for all every w ∈ S, we have: s
P∩Q
→a w iﬀ s
P
→a w ∈ Q. It is easy to see that
the this deﬁnition of conditional doxastic frames is equivalent to the above one 11 .
Applying the standard Kripke relational deﬁnition of modalities to the condi-
tional doxastic relations s
P
→a t, we obtain a new operator B
P
a on S-propositions,
expressing conditional beliefs; in terms of appearance maps, the deﬁnition says that
conditional belief is the Galois dual of conditional appearance:
BPa Q := {s ∈ S : s
P
a ⊆ Q}
We read this as saying that agent a believes Q conditional of P . More precisely, this
says that: if the agent would learn P , then (after learning) he would come to believe
that Q was the case in the current state (before the learning). Notice that beliefs
conditional to the trivially true proposition S coincide with the usual, unconditional
beliefs: BSa Q = BaQ.
As a consequence of the above postulates, the knowledge operator, deﬁned (as
in the previous section) as the Galois dual of epistemic appearance KaP := {s ∈
S : s(a) ⊆ P}, has the following property:
KaP =
⋂
Q⊆S
BQa P = B
¬P
a ∅ = B
¬P
a P
We can also deﬁne conditional versions of general belief, common true belief, knowl-
edge, general knowledge, common knowledge, by putting: EbPQ :=
⋂
a∈AB
P
a Q,
11 In one way they are equivalent by putting •Pa =
dP
→a (where bR is the image-map of R), and in the opposite
way by putting: s
P
→at iﬀ t ∈ sPa .
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CbPQ :=
⋂
n≥0(Eb
P )nQ = Q ∩ EbPQ ∩ EbP (EbP )Q ∩ ..., KPa Q := Ka(P → Q),
EkQ :=
⋂
a∈AK
P
a Q, Ck
PQ :=
⋂
n≥0(Ek
P )nQ
Theorem 4.1 A CDM is equivalent to a semantic AGM theory over a KB-model.
Proof. Given an AGM theory over a KB-model, we deﬁne sPa := sa ∗a P , and
check this satisﬁes the clauses of a CDM . For the converse, start with a CDM ,
and put Ta := {s
P
a : s ∈ S,P ⊆ S}. Deﬁne a revision operator T ∗a Q for our
theories T = sPa ∈ Ta, by cases: if we have P ∩ s(a) = ∅ (i.e. if s
P
a = ∅), then
we put sPa ∗a Q := ∅ ; if we have P ∩ s(a) = ∅, but P ∩ Q ∩ s(a) = ∅, then put
sPa ∗a Q := s
Q
a ; else, put sPa ∗a Q := s
P∩Q
a = sPa ∩ Q = s
Q
a ∩ P . It is easy to check
the KB conditions. 
Examples of CDM ’s: Any KB-model is a CDM ; indeed, we can trivially convert
a KB-model into a CDM , by putting: sPa = sa ∩ P , whenever sa ∩ P = ∅, and
sPa = s(a)∩P otherwise. Of course, this is only one way to organize a KB-model as
a CDM , a very special case corresponding to the most trivial belief revision policy,
encoded in the principle: “when your beliefs are contradicted by new facts, give
them all up and stick with what you know”. A more general example is given by:
Plausibility Models: An epistemic plausibility frame is a structure (S,∼a,≤a)a∈A,
consisting of a set S endowed with a family of equivalence relations ∼a and a
family of “well-preorders” ≤a, one for each agent a. Here, a “well-preorder” is
just a preorder ≤ on S such that every subset has minimal elements; i.e. for
every set T ⊆ S there exists t ∈ T such that t ≤ t′ for all t′ ∈ T . An epistemic
plausibility frame together with a valuation gives an epistemic plausibility model.
Plausibility frames for only one agent and without the epistemic relations have been
used as models for AGM belief revision in [12,22] etc. A more concrete example of
plausibility frames was given by W. Spohn in [24], in terms of ordinal preference
maps assigning ordinals d(s) (“the degree of plausibility” of s) to each state s ∈ S.
In our epistemic multi-agent context, this would give us structures consisting of a
multi-agent knowledge frame (S,∼a)a∈A, together with an ordinal plausibility map
da : S → Ord (where Ord is the family of all ordinals).
Any epistemic plausibility model gives rise to a CDM , in a canonical way, by
putting
sPa := Min≤a {t ∈ P : t ∼a s}
where Min≤a T = {t ∈ T : t ≤a t
′ for all t′ ∈ T} is the set of minimal elements in
T . We call this the canonical CDM associated to the given plausibility model. The
converse is given by the following:
Theorem 4.2 (Representation Theorem) Every CDM is the canonical CDM
of some epistemic plausibility model.
Proof. Given a CDM S = (S, {•Pa }a∈A,P⊆S), take for each a some arbitrary well-
ordering ≤a of the family {s(a) : s ∈ S} of all epistemic appearances. Deﬁne s ∼a t
iﬀ s(a) = t(a). Deﬁne s ≤a t by: either s(a) ≤
a t(a), or s(a) = t(a), s ∈ t
{s,t}
a . It is
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easy to check that this is an epistemic plausibility model, whose canonical CDM is
S itself. 
So our setting in terms of CDM ’s is equivalent to a more standard one in
terms of plausibility models. Nevertheless, the proof of the above theorem shows
the correspondence is not one-to-one 12 : the same CDM corresponds canonically
to many plausibility models. In its turn, the same plausibility model corresponds
to many Spohn-type models (in terms of plausibility degrees). In this paper, we
take the conditional doxastic structure as fundamental, since we are interested in
a logic of conditional beliefs. This means that, for our purposes, not only the
actual assignment da of ordinal degrees of plausibility, but even much of the induced
structure of the plausibility relations ≤a, is irrelevant: they contain superﬂuous
features. The important thing are the corresponding conditional doxastic maps.
Conditional Doxastic Logic (CDL). We now change BKL to a version in which
belief operators are conditionalized. The syntax of CDL is given by:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Bϕaϕ | Cbϕϕ | Ckϕϕ ,
while the semantics is given by the obvious compositional clauses for the interpreta-
tion map ‖ • ‖S : CDL→ P(S) in a CDM S. In this logic, the knowledge modality
can be deﬁned as an abbreviation, putting Kaφ := B
¬φ
a ⊥ (where ⊥ = p ∧ ¬p is an
inconsistent sentence), or equivalently Kaφ := B
¬φ
a φ. 13 It is easy to see that this
agrees semantically with the previous deﬁnition of the semantic knowledge operator
(as the Galois dual of epistemic appearance): ‖Kaφ‖S = Ka‖φ‖S. We also deﬁne
Kθaϕ := Ka(θ → ϕ), Eb
θϕ :=
∧
a∈AB
θ
aϕ, Ek
θϕ :=
∧
a∈AK
θ
aϕ.
Theorem 4.3 A sound and complete proof system for CDL is obtained as follows:
ﬁrst, include all the axioms and rules of classical propositional logic; second, include
Necessitation Rules for all modalities: from  ϕ infer  Bψa ϕ,  Ckϕ and  Cbψϕ ;
third, include the following axioms:
Normality:  Bθa(ϕ → ψ) → (B
θ
aϕ → B
θ
aψ)
 Cbθ(ϕ → ψ) → (Cbθϕ → Cbθψ)
 Ckθ(ϕ → ψ) → (Ckθϕ → Ckθψ)
Truthfulness of Knowledge:  Kaϕ → ϕ
Persistence of Knowledge:  Kaϕ → B
ψ
a ϕ
Full Introspection:  Bψa ϕ → KaB
ψ
a ϕ
 ¬Bψa ϕ → Ka¬B
ψ
a ϕ
Hypotheses are (hypothetically) accepted:  Bϕaϕ
12 Indeed, this is shown by the arbitrary choice of the well-orders ≤a.
13This way of deﬁning knowledge in terms of doxastic conditionals can be traced back to [25].
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Minimality of revision:  ¬Bϕa¬ψ → (B
ϕ∧ψ
a θ ↔ B
ϕ
a (ψ → θ))
Fixed-Point Axioms:  Cbθϕ → ϕ ∧ EbθCbθϕ
 Ckθϕ → ϕ ∧ EkθCkθϕ
Induction Axioms:  Cbθ(ϕ → Ebθϕ) → (ϕ → Cbθϕ)
 Ckθ(ϕ → Ekθϕ) → (ϕ → Ckθϕ)

Related to our topic are the standard philosophical problems of using condi-
tionals in belief revision models (see for instance [11,15,20]). In this context, it is
interesting to see how our conditional belief operators, understood as conditionals,
can avoid Gardenfors’ triviality result [11], which has been used to argue that stan-
dard AGM theory is incompatible with a conditional-based view of belief revision.
This result was based on the assumption that any such conditional should satisfy
the so-called Ramsey test [19]. Following [20], the Ramsey test can be stated in
syntactic terms as saying that
(R) “if P then Q” ∈ T iﬀ Q ∈ T ∗ P
If we interpret the conditional “if P then Q” as our conditional belief BPa Q, interpret
the revision operator as the operator ∗a deﬁned above (in the proof of the theorem
on the equivalence between CDM ’s and AGM theories over KB models), and
interpret “theories” T to mean elements of Ta in a CDM (as deﬁned in the above-
mentioned proof, i.e. theories of the form T = sRa , for some proposition R), then
we obtain the following semantic version of the Ramsey test:
(R∗?) for every R ⊆ S : sRa ⊆ B
P
a Q iﬀ s
R
a ∗a P ⊆ Q.
It is easy to check this is false: given our CDM postulates, the (R∗)-test fails under
this interpretation. To see this, observe that the left-hand side of (R∗?) is equivalent
to ∀t ∈ sRa : t
P
a ⊆ Q. But, by our postulates, t ∈ s
R
a implies t
P
a = s
P
a = sa ∗a P . So,
whenever sRa = ∅, the left-hand side of (R∗?) is simply equivalent to sa ∗a P ⊆ Q,
which is in general not equivalent to the right-hand side sRa ∗a P ⊆ Q. So we
see that the Ramsey test could only succeed if we had sa = s
R
a in general, i.e. if
conditional beliefs would collapse to unconditional ones: this is in a way our own
semantic version of Gardenfors’ triviality result. On the other hand, observe that
(R∗?) does hold in unconditional contexts, that is for R = S (i.e. for theories of the
form T = sa): sa ⊆ B
P
a Q iﬀ sa ∗a P = s
P
a ⊆ Q.
The deep ﬂaw underlying the Ramsey test is that it treats hypothetical beliefs
about beliefs in the same way as hypothetical beliefs about facts; the test would suc-
ceed only if, when making a hypothesis, agents would revise their beliefs about
their own beliefs in the same way they revise their factual beliefs. But this is in-
consistent with the restrictions posed by introspective knowledge to belief revision:
introspective agents know their own beliefs, and so cannot accept hypotheses that
go against this knowledge. A hypothetical belief system (e.g. the theory sRa in
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the above counterexample) may include diﬀerent ontic statements than the uncon-
ditional belief system (sa); but it includes precisely the same doxastic/epistemic
statements BPa Q as this unconditional belief system. Due to introspection, beliefs
about beliefs cannot be revised, not in the sense of (“static”) belief revision that we
have here. 14 Only a “dynamic” kind of belief revision (that aims to represent the
revised beliefs of the agent about the situation after the revision) would satisfy some
(suitably modiﬁed) Ramsey test.
5 Dynamic Belief Revision: Public Announcements
The belief revision encoded in the conditional doxastic models above is of a static,
purely hypothetical, nature. Indeed, the revision operators cannot alter models in
any way: all the possibilities are already there, so both the unconditional and the
revised, conditional beliefs refer to the same world and the same moment in time. 15
In contrast, a belief update is a dynamic form of belief revision, meant to capture the
actual change of beliefs induced by learning (or by other forms of epistemic/doxastic
actions). As already noticed before [13,6,5], the original model does not usually
include enough states to capture all the epistemic possibilities that arise in this
way. So, contrary to the previous section, we now allow for belief revisions that
change the original CDM . In this section we focus on public announcements, which
change epistemic (and conditional doxastic) models in a minimal way: they can
only shrink the model by “relativization” to a given sentence.
Given a model (CDM) S, denote by sQa , ‖.‖ the appearance maps and valuation
in S. For any S-proposition P ⊆ S, we deﬁne the relativized CDM P!(S) by taking:
(i) the set of states of P!(S) is the set P ,
(ii) (sQa )P!(S) := s
Q
a , for every s ∈ P and Q ⊆ P ,
(iii) ‖p‖P!(S) := ‖p‖ ∩ P .
As an immediate consequence, we get that unconditional beliefs after the update
come from prior conditional beliefs: (sa)P!(S) = (s
P
a )P!(S) = s
P
a .
We interpret the action P ! as a transition relation from any current state s ∈ S
satisfying P to the state s ∈ P!(S). The syntax of our public announcement logic
is obtained by simply adding constructs involving dynamic modalities < ϕ! > ϕ
to the syntax of CDL. For the semantics we include the following extra clause:
‖ < ϕ! > ψ‖S = ‖ψ‖‖ϕ‖
S
!(S).
To obtain a sound and complete proof system, we add reduction axioms for public
announcements to the axioms of CDL:
14Remember that BPa Q means “if a would learn P , then he would come to believe that Q had been the
case (before the learning)”. Suppose you happen to believe ¬P , and somebody asks you: “If I was to tell
you that P was the case, would that change your mind about the fact that you currently believe ¬P ?”.
Clearly, the correct answer is: “No, it wouldn’t. It would indeed change my belief about P , but not my
belief about the fact that now I believe ¬P”.
15 Indeed, the postulate (*2) (and the corresponding clause (4) in the deﬁnition of CD-frames) can only
hold if a revision with so-called Moore sentences (e.g. ϕ ∧ ¬Kaϕ) is understood to be only hypothetically
possible. The agent a’s actual beliefs after learning such a sentence cannot possibly include the sentence
itself.
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< ϕ! > p ↔ ϕ ∧ p < ϕ! > ¬ψ ↔ ϕ ∧ ¬ < ϕ! > ψ
< ϕ! > (ψ ∧ θ) ↔ < ϕ! > ψ∨ < ϕ! > θ < ϕ! > Ckθaψ ↔ ϕ ∧ Ck
<ϕ!>θ
a < ϕ! > ψ
< ϕ! > Bθaψ ↔ ϕ ∧ B
<ϕ!>θ
a < ϕ! > ψ < ϕ! > Cb
θ
aψ ↔ ϕ ∧ Cb
<ϕ!>θ
a < ϕ! > ψ
where p’s denote atomic sentences.
6 Private Announcements to subgroups
In this section we deal with the speciﬁc action of “privately learning a fact” or, more
generally, a “private announcement P !A to a subgroup of agents”. The intuition
is that the announcement is broadcasted to the agents of a group A, while the
outsiders B ∈ A do not suspect this is happening. For simplicity, we consider
here the case in which it is common knowledge that nothing else can happen: this
particular announcement (of this particular sentence P to the group A) is the only
message that may be broadcasted at this time; the only alternative is no message
being sent, i.e. the silent action τAP in which “nothing happens” (but in which the
outsiders don’t know this, so they think it is possible that the message P was in fact
broadcasted to group A).
Given a CDM S and an S-proposition P ⊆ S, we deﬁne the a new, updated
CDM under private announcements P!A(S) as follows: for each of the old states
s ∈ S we take two distinct new copies P !A(s) (meant to denote the state after P
was announced to the group A) and τAP (s) (meant to denote the corresponding
state in which nothing really happened, but the outsiders b ∈ A consider possible
that P was announced to group A). Then the new model S′ is obtained by putting:
(i) the new set of states of P!A(S) is the set S
′ = P !A(P ) ∪ τAP (S)
(ii) for all a ∈ A: P !A(s)
Q
a := P !A( s
P !−1A (Q)
a ) and τAP (s)
Q
a := τAP ( s
τAP
−1(Q)
a )
(iii) for all b ∈ A: τAP (s)
Q
b = P !A(s)
Q
b := τAP ( s
τAP
−1(Q)
b ) , if s(b)∩τAP
−1(Q) = ∅;
and τAP (s)
Q
b = P !A(s)
Q
b := P !A( s
P !−1A (Q)
b ), otherwise
(iv) ‖p‖S′ := P !A(‖p‖S) ∪ τAP (‖p‖S),
where we used the notations σ(Q) := {σ(s) : s ∈ Q} and σ−1(Q′) := {s ∈ S : σ(s) ∈
Q′} for any of the two “actions” σ ∈ {P !A, τAP}, and for all sets Q ⊆ S, Q
′ ⊆ S′.
We explain the clauses for conditional belief update. For clause 2: the insiders know
in any case which action σ happened (be it P !A or τAP ), so if after that action they
are given some new information Q they apply the following algorithm. They ﬁrst
reconsider their beliefs about the past states, in the view of the new information:
they might have to revise these beliefs with the fact that, after this speciﬁc action
happens, Q becomes true; so they revise their beliefs about the past state with
σ−1(Q); then they run back to present, by applying action σ to the states allowed
by these past beliefs: this gives their current belief about the state of the world after
the action σ. In clause 3, the outsiders apply essentially the same algorithm, but
(not knowing which action really happens) they keep the default belief that what
they see, that is action τAP (i.e. “nothing”), is what is happening; so they apply
the above algorithm only to action σ = τAP ; unless this is contradicted by the new
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information Q, i.e. unless it is already known beforehand that Q cannot become
true after τAP ; in which case, they “revise their belief about the current action”:
they realize that P !A is happening, so they apply the above algorithm to σ = P !A.
For our syntax, we replace the public announcement modalities above < ϕ! >
with dynamic modalities < ϕ!A > and < τAϕ > corresponding to the two types of
action above. 16 The semantics is given by the standard PDL clause: ‖ < σ >
ψ‖S := {s ∈ S : σ(s) exists and σ(s) ∈ ‖ψ‖S′}. To get a complete proof system, we
replace the reduction axiom for conditional beliefs with the axioms:
< ϕ!A > B
θ
aψ↔ϕ ∧B
<ϕ!A>θ
a < ϕ!A > ψ
< τAϕ > B
θ
aψ↔B
<τAϕ>θ
a < τAϕ > ψ
< ϕ!A > B
θ
bψ↔ϕ ∧B
<τAϕ>θ
b < τAϕ > ψ ∧ (Kb[τAϕ]¬θ → B
<ϕ!A>θ
b < ϕ!A > ψ)
< τAϕ > B
θ
bψ↔B
<τAϕ>θ
b < τAϕ > ψ ∧ (Kb[τAϕ]¬θ → B
<ϕ!A>θ
b < ϕ!A > ψ) ,
for all insiders a ∈ A and all outsiders b ∈ B. With these modiﬁcations, and by
eliminating the axioms and rules referring to common knowledge and common belief,
we obtain a sound and complete proof system for the logic of private announcements
(without common knowledge/belief). 17 And ﬁnally, here is the promised “dynamic
analogue” of the Ramsey test (which is valid, unlike its static counterpart):
R!a(s)a ⊆ Ba[P !a]Q iﬀ P !a(R!a(s)a) ⊆ Q
Back to Mary. Having introduced these models, we return to the example pre-
sented in the introduction. So given Eve (e), Adam (a) and Mary (m), we denote
the states in the initial model S by x = (xe, xa, xm), with xe, xa, xm ∈ {0, 1} where
0 =clean and 1 =dirty. The epistemic uncertainty relation is clear: agents see each
other but not themselves, so x(i) = {y ∈ S : yj = xj for all j = i}. We can con-
vert this into a KB-model by e.g. assuming that agents start by being “cautious”,
i.e. believing only what they know. This sets xi = x(i). For conditional beliefs,
we can use e.g. the “most trivial” belief revision policy (introduced in section 4):
sPi = si ∩ P , whenever si ∩ P = ∅, and s
P
i = s(i) ∩ P otherwise.
18
Now, the real state of the world is w = (1, 1, 0). Mary’s initial belief and
knowledge is wm = w(m) = {(1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0)}. After father’s announcement,
the state (0, 0, 0) is eliminated. Eve’s peek in the mirror can be modeled as
a private announcement γ = 1e!e to herself (where the atomic sentence 1
e in-
dicates that Eve’s forehead is dirty), and the alternative (no peeking) is de-
noted by τ := τe1
e. After that, in the resulting model S′, Mary’s knowledge is
γ(w)(m) = {τ(1, 1, 1), τ(1, 1, 0), γ(1, 1, 1), γ(1, 1, 0)}, while her belief is γ(w)m =
{τ(1, 1, 1), τ(1, 1, 0)}. But after Eve’s public announcement (Ke1
e)!, the model
shrinks to the set S′′ := ‖Ke1
e‖S′ = {γ(1, x
a, xm) : xa, xm ∈ {0, 1}}. Mary’s
16For reasons of simplicity, we eliminate common knowledge and common belief operators.
17We considered only this restricted logic for simplicity. As in the simpler case of purely epistemic updates
with a private announcement (without belief revision) in [5], one can also obtain a complete axiomatization
of the logic with common knowledge and common belief, by adding some generalized “Dynamic-Epistemic
Induction” proof rules.
18But note that this particular choice of a trivial belief revision policy is irrelevant for the rest of this
argument: the same analysis as below can be applied to any CDM based on the above KB model.
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unconditional beliefs after the public announcement are obtained using her prior
conditional beliefs (γ(w)m)S′′ = γ(w)
S′′
m . To evaluate the last term we need to use
the second case of clause 3 in the deﬁnition of private announcements (since we have
wm ∩ τ
−1(S′′) = ∅ ): (γ(w)m)S′′ = γ
S′′
m = γ(w
γ−1(S′′)
m ) = γ(w(m) ∩ γ−1(S′′) ) =
γ(w(m) ) = {γ(1, 1, 1), γ(1, 1, 0)}. This is a non-empty set of possible states: so
Mary is still sane! Moreover, all her possible states are outputs of the action γ: she
knows that γ has happened. In other words: Mary discovers that cheating (γ) has
taken place!
7 Conclusion
We have presented here a new, qualitative semantic implementation of the AGM
belief revision theory, in terms of conditional doxastic models. Based on this, we
proposed a revised semantics for public and private announcements, incorporating
belief revision into the notion of update. This “Merciful Logic” solves problems
such as the ones posed by the above cheating version of the Muddy Children Puzzle,
preventing agents from going mad when their beliefs are invalidated.
The semantical structures used in this paper have an algebraic counterpart.
In [7], a ﬁrst attempt has been made to work out an algebraic setting for multi-
agent belief revision. In unpublished work [8], we generalize the present setting to
allow other types of actions. More precisely, all epistemic action models in [6,4,5]
can be conditionalized. The updated CDM’s are actually the result of taking the
“update product” (in a sense that reﬁnes the concept in [5]) of the initial conditional
doxastic state model with a conditional doxastic action model. But the deﬁnition
of the general update is rather complex and technical, and would require a lot of
preparation and justiﬁcation. To build a case for it, we chose for simplicity (and
due to lack of space) to concentrate here on two very special cases, of great intuitive
appeal. But the general picture can already be glimpsed from our example: looking
back at Mary, Adam and Eve, it is obvious that when Mary revises her beliefs
as part of the update with action (Ke1
e)!, she actually deduces that the cheating
action γ = 1e!e has happened (instead of τ); so she revises not only her static beliefs
about propositions, but also her beliefs about actions.
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